And Everyone’s the Same, and On and On
Post-invasion iraq - - Posted on April, 28 at 11:32 am by Eric Martin
I might have to begin making a series out of the “Here’s a better question…” formulation. At the very least, this is the second installment, following up on my previous effort (see Swopa here, riffing off of that post with more trenchant analysis, as usual). Today’s episode comes courtesy of Juan Cole [emphasis added]:
Nationalist young Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr on Wednesday condemned the US plans to build a wall around the Adhamiya district of Baghdad, calling it “evil” and warning it would reinforce sectarianism. Al-Sadr has a pan-Islamic rhetoric, but at night his Mahdi Army goons murder Sunni Arabs in the street. It remains to be seen if he is capable of reining in his goons and actually put together an anti-Coalition alliance of both Shiites and Sunnis.
A better hypothetical would be, “It remains to be seen if Sadr has any desire to rein in his goons and actually put together an anti-Coalition alliance of both Shiites and Sunnis.” Actually, it doesn’t really remain to be seen, absent a dramatic transformation of Sadr that just isn’t in the cards. Even entertaining the possibility that Sadr would pursue a unified Shiite/Sunni agenda at this time shows a fundamental misunderstanding of the objectives, tactics and strategies of Sadr and the myriad other players currently occupying Iraq’s political mosaic (if such a possibility existed, it was probably only circa the first siege of Fallujah, but has since disappeared).
Sadr is a Shiite partisan who wants to secure power, influence and economic resources for himself and his particular constituency - just like every other major Shiite leader/faction operating in Iraq (SCIRI, Dawa, Fadhila, Chalabi, etc.). Same goes for the other sects/ethnic factions attempting to impose their respective agendas via the ubiquitous barrels of guns (Sunni ex-Baathists, al-Qaeda types, Kurds, Allawi, etc.). It is a rotating and intricate spider web of armed competition for the oldest motivations in the book: money, power and respect.
Sadr uses the “nationalist” and “anti-occupation” rhetoric to secure his base of support. Heck, he might be a true believer of sorts for what it’s worth - which isn’t much. Other Shiite and Kurdish groups use US forces - and the “democratic” process - to help achieve their ends. The Sunnis mostly appeal to religious authority - invoking jihad - as well as the inspiration provided by, alternatively, avarice, fear, vengeance, injustice and deprivation.
But Sadr is not a “nationalist” in the truest sense of the word. His view of “nationalism” is Shiite-centric, with his own particular conception of “Shiite identity” - and by extension, “Iraqi identity” - taking precedence. Similarly, Sistani (also erroneously described as a “nationlist” by many onlookers), is the apex of the Shiite-centric firmament. Above all, Sistani wants to guarantee lasting, if not permanent, Shiite control over Iraq. He is not inclined to let the unique opportunity afforded by the clumsy US invasion elude him. Sadr plays but one part in Sistani’s grand design, and the two Shiite leaders have solidified a close and symbiotic relationship as a result (at least for now).
That is why Sistani, very early on, seized on the notion of “democracy” and wrested the process from the Americans. In “democracy,” Sistani recognizes the vehicle needed to deliver him to the promised land by virtue of the Shiites’ numerical (and thus electoral) superiority. But he is not a “democrat” in the sense that he espouses enlightened views of liberalism, minority rights and restraint on the excesses of majoritarianism. Quite the opposite. In Sistani’s view, such democratic principles should remain subordinate to the larger goal of Shiite dominance.
Any talk about Sistani pushing for “reconciliation” and normalization between the warring factions misses this crucial point. Sistani would accept an armistice, I suppose - as long as such an accord was based on his terms (read: no Baathists in power, Shiite control over the government’s major institutions, and a generally disempowered Sunni population). But Sistani is not pushing for a compromise. Evidence of this can be found in the governing style and platform of the Shiite-led Iraqi governments. The same governments that owe their position to the Sistani-devised and enforced united Shiite political slate.
Why is it, do you suppose, that the Bush administration has recently pulled back on the throttle with respect to efforts to fill out the ranks of the Iraqi army and security forces? These institutions, notionally under the control of the “state of Iraq,” were heavily infiltrated instruments in the hands of the various warring factions - who almost always are willing to capitalize on the largess and naivete of the occupying powers.
Worth noting: both Sadr and Sistani, within a week of each other, came out against the recent attempt to pass laws relaxing the scope and harshness of de-Baathification. In addition, neither Sadr nor Sistani (nor SCIRI and Dawa - nor the Kurds for that matter), have shown any inclination to pursue the equitable resolution of any of the other major political stumbling blocks forestalling broader rapprochement (assuming the Sunnis would go for that in the first place, which is not a given). Interesting behavior for a couple of “nationalists” looking to broach ethnic/sectarian divisions, no?
That is not to say that there are not tensions and infighting on the Shiite side of the ledger (and Sunni and Kurdish sides as well). After all, each sub-group is trying to secure as much of the aforementioned power, influence and economic resources as possible - even where such gains are to be made vis-a-vis their putative co-ethnic/sectarian “allies.” The grabbing hands, grab all they can.
Don’t be fooled by the shifting alliances, intrigue and gamesmanship on display, though. There will be rumors and reports of shocking splits and nascent alliances that will, in the end, return to the farcical ether from where they were conjured serving no purpose other than the murky designs of the rumor spreaders themselves. Until each of the major groups (Shiite, Kurdish and Sunni) feels secure enough in their respective positions, the infighting will be kept at a manageable level and the cross-ethnic/sectarian outreach will be stunted. The larger problem is, though, that each of the factions’ efforts to attain and consolidate the desired secure position is fueling the civil war and related violence from Kirkuk, to Anbar, to Basra in the South. They’re still stuck in the fight for superiority mode.
Against this backdrop, praise for the enlightened efforts - or democratic bona fides - of the “Iraqi government” seem foolish and detached from reality. That same government is comprised of several of the aforementioned warring factions, and has consistently and relentlessly pursued a narrow, self-serving agenda. By hitching our wagon to this government, we have become, at best, an irrelevant spectator and at worst, a tool wielded by opportunistic Iraqi groups.
In search of an alternative, we are left casting about aimlessly for some non-existent Iraqi majority movement that is secular, liberal, enlightened, pro-American and, above all, not based in communalism. No doubt, there are many Iraqis that would embrace such a political movement of inclusion, but many of those same Iraqis have, in a pattern of negative self-selection, chosen to leave the chaos behind and join the stream of refugees heading for the exits. Riverbend included. Even under the best circumstances, though, it would remain doubtful that this political movement would have the numbers and mandate to overcome the power and influence of the current array of actors.
In the meantime, we cycle through a series of plans, strategies and tactics that range from embracing Shiite dominance at the expense of the Sunni population, to courting certain Sunni resistance groups in order to use as leverage to gain concessions from a dominant and uncompromising Shiite majority. We are precluded from pushing too strongly in either direction, or from helping one side to vanquish the other.
Unrestrained support of the Shiite factions in their effort to score a decisive victory over their Sunni rivals would cause a surge in al-Qaeda’s popularity (as the mostly Sunni Arab world watches us partake in the slaughter of their brethren), and further alienate and anger our Sunni allies in the region (Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, etc.). Those same Sunni allies have taken on an extra degree of importance as of late, as a result of our ulterior goal of counterbalancing the suddenly ascendant Iran. More incoherence and contradicting goals.
Speaking of which, leaning too heavily on the Shiite factions would push them further into the arms of Iran - a reality, the parameters of which, we are just beginning to appreciate. The Iraqi Shiites don’t necessarily need us, as we’re not the only potential patron in the neighborhood. Further, escalating hostilities with the Shiites just isn’t logistically feasible. If we are currently unable to defeat a Sunni insurgency representing roughly 20% of Iraq’s population, the odds of defeating a Shiite insurgency comprising approximately 60% of Iraq’s population are equivalent to a snowball’s chances at longevity in Hades.
Whether you view our herky-jerky, often contradictory and incoherent attempts to forge stability from the raw materials in Iraq as a noble effort to improve the lives of the Iraqi people - or some necessary prerequisite to securing the acceptability of our permanent military presence and access to oil - it is well past futile. The various Iraqi factions recognize that in the end we will leave one way or the other, and they will remain. They can wait us out, or play the game within the parameters set, as necessary. And so they do.
As Petraeus is fond of saying, there is no military solution in Iraq, only a political solution. The Surge, he admits, will not itself overcome any of the fundamental challenges facing Iraq. He’s right. The Surge’s main justification is that it will lead to an abatement of the violence, and in that period of calmness, the various factions can better forge a modus vivendi acceptable to all.
But the major impediment to forging a broad-based, political accord in Iraq is not necessarily the steady violence. That is a symptom, not the pathology (though it does exacerbate the pathology, somewhat, in a reinforcing loop). The underlying cause of the violence lies in the fact that each side is pursuing competing goals, and no side has the desire to make concessions or abandon their armed component. The Surge won’t change that calculus.
It’s time to get out of Dodge.
Posted in Post-invasion iraq |
April 28th, 2007 at 12:42 pm
Riverbend is ok? Thank god! I was worried about her.
April 28th, 2007 at 12:46 pm
I agree its time to get out.
But don’t u think that a timetabled withdrawal allows a crystallisation around the premise of a unified country if properly managed?
I mean, if Cromwell (or some other statesman of note) was there, wouldn’t it all become possible?
April 28th, 2007 at 1:00 pm
This is not an aimless search. It is intrinsically the majority of any society (except the last bit)
Probably quite true, but there will usually be a grain of real motivation behind such machinations. We need to identify those that are real and legitimate, and address them. This will foster a climate of justice and build trust in the leadership (or so my research has shown).
Its all about applying judgement constantly on what activities are permitted and not permitted. Earlier, they’re like a bunch of squabbling children. Later (as we have seen in Australian politics) things gradually mature as constructive activities are systemically rewarded.
April 28th, 2007 at 2:06 pm
Yep, & if it turns out he’s in the pay of the CIA or such…he better run.
(http://www.holology.com/iraq.html#32)
Check out the above link…it’s very cool.
Divide et impera…divide and rule (also known as divide and conquer) is a combination political, military and economic strategy of gaining and maintaining power by breaking up larger concentrations of power into chunks that individually have less power than the one implementing the strategy. In reality, it often refers to a strategy where small power groups are prevented from linking up and becoming more powerful, since it is difficult to break up existing power structures.
(wikipedia)
I like the Dodge reference Eric…but who will be the new Sheriff & Deputy that cleans up?…:)
April 29th, 2007 at 2:01 am
This is not an aimless search. It is intrinsically the majority of any society (except the last bit)
True, but in Iraq, so many (millions in fact) of those predisposed to have moderate views have literally left the country. This has created a situation where the population left behind has a higher concentration of combatants and zealous partisans. When you subtract the refugees, and subtract the Kurds who have no real interest in forging such a pact (they’d rather just go their own way) and then subtract those represented by Sistani, Sadr, SCIRI, Dawa and the various Sunni combatants, I don’t think you’re left with a majority of Iraqis.
Add to that the fears in the Shiite community of letting the Sunnis get too close to the reins of power (fearing a coup somewhere down the road - which is not a baseless fear), and the tendency for each group to view elections as a communally based zero sum game, and what have you got left?
All previous efforts to run candidates and parties claiming to represent this moderate middle have resulted in paltry showings.
Probably quite true, but there will usually be a grain of real motivation behind such machinations. We need to identify those that are real and legitimate, and address them. This will foster a climate of justice and build trust in the leadership (or so my research has shown).
My concern is that the “real motivation” will be to maximize the gains of a given group engaged in this multifaceted, shifting power struggle.
Its all about applying judgement constantly on what activities are permitted and not permitted. Earlier, they’re like a bunch of squabbling children. Later (as we have seen in Australian politics) things gradually mature as constructive activities are systemically rewarded.
A few thoughts on this: First, our judgment is dubious at best. This is their turf, and I don’t think we’ve ever really grasped the motivations and designs of the various parties. From before the invasion on. Also, our ability to reward and influence such events is limited. Ultimately, Sistani holds far too many cards - and he always has. Which itself was a shock to us - again, illustrating what a galling lack of knowledge we had going in.
April 29th, 2007 at 2:03 am
I like the Dodge reference Eric…but who will be the new Sheriff & Deputy that cleans up?
Whither Wyatt al-Earp?
Honestly, I don’t know.
May 1st, 2007 at 3:37 pm
[...] to international news, Eric Martin submits his most cogent case yet for withdrawal from Iraq, on the basis that none of the armed factions (including the government) share the occupying [...]
May 2nd, 2007 at 11:53 am
Great post, Eric, if somewhat depressing. With today’s veto, it looks like this thing drags on indefinitely. The notion that a President with the will to do something other avoid responsibility couldn’t, with congress, come up with a better plan of action than this endless deferal, is depressing.
Not even William Buckley’s assessment of the damage it is doing to conservatism is adequate compensation for this clusterfuck. Nowhere near…
May 3rd, 2007 at 5:43 am
Depressing indeed Tim. Worse than that, it’s heart-wrenching tragic. So many lives utterly destroyed. Such senseless and overwhelming pain experienced by so many people.
And Bush can think of nothing but more of the same.
May 3rd, 2007 at 3:03 pm
“And Bush can think of nothing but more of the same.”
And Howard can think of nothing more but continuing to go along with his ‘mate’.
May 3rd, 2007 at 7:56 pm
so true Eric…& Tim…exactly my sentiments. It seems we are destined to live thru another Vietnam war…the pendulum towards mass sanity moves oh so slowly. Particularly when you have a mainstream media
obsessed w/ stirring up conflict & avoiding the REAL because of ratings & allegiances…caring more about the bank balance & shares than those dying & suffering. And the politicians have their own selfish determinants.
yes, an egotistical little fraudster who plays ‘commander-in-chief’ like a child in front of a board game…he has no ability nor desire to see beyond his own myopic beliefs & sense of power…never recognising his true failings…ever convincing himself that ‘esteem’ comes w/ being the ‘gentleman’ of the Elite who ride the same carousel as his family dynasty…doing their bidding, heeding their ‘faux’ praise…never being enuff of an individual to stand aside from the CON & see that he should be a President serving all the people…heeding the long-term majority view…accepting that sometimes ‘you just get it wrong’ & that digging in is just plain bad for Democracy…& peace.
I constantly hear this diatribe of fear that invokes images of Terrorists w/ a dirty bomb filled suitcase. That if ‘we aren’t fighting them over there, they’ll hit us over here”. It’s just freakin’ juvenile thinking. As if stirring up the hornet’s nest in Iraq is going to improve that situation…in fact, it’s become a training ground & motivational arena for that kind of kook. It helps us take the eye of the ball…drains our resources & funds…makes for a more divided & poorer society…just the kinda place that creates so much HATE & DESPAIR that eventually that stupid nightmare these dickwads evoke becomes a self-perpetuating reality.
Polly TO…it just defies reasoning. It really does.